So yesterday while going through the mail filters, I cam across this email: Looks to be pretty standard stuff to be honest. So the first thing that I did was run this through decalage2’s Vipermonkey to see if I could get at the macro script. Unfortunately Vipermonkey died and was…
This blog entry is going to cover how I managed to de-obfuscate the macro from the Emotet sample that I was able to grab. The maldoc can be found in my Github repo located here: https://github.com/bloomer1016/2019-02-12-Deobfuscating-Emotet-Maldoc. Indicators of Compromise: ========================== MD5 of Word doc: 35c716c82f9912cb1a57bf7ee72e0c53 VT: https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/9fb5e5242394557e27ca3ccfc492f7db0f7474662148a8797953df702b4d78db/detection Any.Run: https://app.any.run/tasks/0e428667-3602-489f-85ac-1f022e2c9c1f Analysis:…
Just a quick post about some emotet malspam from this morning. Pretty standard from what I can tell. For the artifacts, ProcMon log, and PCAP, please see the repo here. IOC: ===== http://kcespolska.pl//Details/2019-01 69.16.238.96:80 / hxxp://greenplastic.com/hUYu36qNEQ 134.0.11.142:80 / hxxp://stats.emalaya.org/gWItwAFU hxxp://innio.biz/rg1n590 hxxp://kiot.coop/yzc2cJzANO hxxp://atkcgnew.evgeni7e.beget.tech/HkHe3fKTc 200.43.114.10:8080 TCP Artifacts: =========== File name: 190118-Untitled-1653.doc File…
**2019-01-07** After talking with some researches about this malware via this Twitter thread, the JAR file is only the delivery mechanism for the VB script inside it. Once the JAR file has been unpacked; the VB script executed that sends traffic to 31.171.152.106:2522 is related to the Adwind RAT. The…
Here is a quick writeup of some DarkComet RAT malspam that I was able to find this morning. The infection method is leveraging the standard RTF buffer overflow technique (CVE-2017-11882). For more information about what DarkComet is, please see the following link: https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/malware-analysis-dark-comet-rat All artifacts can be found over at…
While looking through the email filters this morning, I came across several emails that had malicious Word docs attached to them. The sender was the same for all the emails along with the document that was attached. This is a write-up of what I was able to get from the…
This is a quick write-up of some Agent Telsa malspam that I was able to find within our email filters. For a good overview of what this malware is and how it works, please see the following links: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/10/who-is-agent-tesla/ https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html For the artifacts found from this investigation, please see my…
There was a phishing email that came in the other day that looked interesting. When I went to the URL found in the PDF, it linked to an ARJ archive file. Once i downloaded this file and extracted it, I saw that there was a VBScript file. Opening this file…
Looking through the email filters in on the 18th of September, I managed to find a small batch of emotet emails from the same sender. The emails themselves tried to spoof email addresses, but Outlook ended up displaying both emails (the spoof and the true sender). Looking through the small…
A quick write-up on this Remcos malspam. Some other previous entries that I have done aboutr Remcos can be found below: https://www.herbiez.com/?p=1106 https://www.herbiez.com/?p=1073 All the emails seem to come from the sender info@yusheng-wiremesh.com with the subject of “Returned Funds fort Invoice DFER4567 July Despatch.” The malspam also comes with an…